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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
reasonable ground.', But it has been decided that exemption of
pipe lines of less than ten miles length from a tax measure 0 and
exemption of farmers and planters, who grind and refine their
own sugar and molasses, from a tax measure by the business of
sugar refining is not within the banned degree of discrimination.' 7
The contention of the dissenting justices in the principal case,
that the prevailing opinion holds a tax on gross sales if laid upon
a graduated basis is always a denial of equal protection, seems to
be well-founded. The court had been committed to the doctrine
that a tax on gross sales on a graduated basis did not deny equal
protection. The arbitrariness of graduation must be a matter of
degree. The tax in the principal case would never equal one per
cent. of the gross sales. The tax approved by the Supreme Court
on salmon fisheries was limited to 25c per case in the higher
bracket. In that case, too, the burden of taxation was higher on
those who produced more. It is suggested that there is no sound
basis for the narrow limits marked out in the prevailing opinion
of the principal case.
-- JOHiN L. DETCH.

INSURANCE -

EFFECT OF LEGAL EXEcuTION OF INSURED Fou

CRum. - Defendant issued an insurance policy to C, promising
to pay the amount of the policy upon receiving proof of the death
of the insured. There was no stated exception of the risk of death
by execution. Held, public policy does not bar recovery on such
a policy by plaintiff, the beneficiary, where the insured was legally
executed for murder. Corey v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.'
Leading in the opposite result is the Supreme Court of the
United States, which has held, where the insured was executed for
murder, that: "There is an implied obligation on his part to do
nothing to wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy," and
that it would be against public policy to enforce the contract under
such circumstances. 2 The instant holding, generally regarded as
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48 S. Ct. 423 (1928).
Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 87 W. Va. 396, 105 S. E. 506 (1920).
17 Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 S. Ct. 43 (1900).
'5
's

'178 S. E. 525 (W. Va. 1935). As to the Incontestable clause precluding a
defense based upon public policy, see (1925) 35 A. L. R. 1491.
2 Burt v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 S. Ct. 139
(1902). The result in this case is weakened by the fact that plaintiff's most
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the better view,3 refutes the implied obligation to do nothing
wrongfully to accelerate payment of the policy by pointing out
that few would adopt murder, followed by public execution, as a
means of accelerating maturity. 4 Hence enforcement of the contract under such circumstances would not tend to induce crime.5
On the contrary, it is more likely that if such policies were not enforced, juries and executive clemency would be perverted to avoid
execution, so that dependents of the insured would not become
public charges." Furthermore, public policy, as expressed in state
constitutions, has abolished corruption of blood and forfeiture of
estate as a consequence of felony.7 Depriving the beneficiaries of
the insurance benefits here would not accord with that policy.
A policy of insurance is a contract of "adhesion". The terms
of such a contract do not result from mutual negotiation; rather,
the insurer fixes the terms, to which the insured may "adhere" if
he chooses." Provisions of such contracts are construed strictly
against the party choosing them.' Such an approach in the instant
case would prevent the court from reading into the insurance
policy any implied obligation by the insured not to subject himself to legal execution, when the insurer has, at its own instance,
failed to provide expressly against such a contingency.
To hold that the beneficiary cannot recover necessarily disregards the ordinary rules of contract law, which direct payment of
th6 policy on maturity. Similar disregard is evidenced where a
person kills another to secure the latter's property by will or by
pressed contention was that the insured had been unjustly executed. Certainly public policy would forbid construing a contract as insurance against
the miscarriage of justice. For further reference to the division of authority
on this point, see the instant case, at 178 S. E. 526.
3 Collins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 232 Ill.
37, 83 N. E. 542
(1907); Weeks v. New York Life Insurance Co., 128 S. C. 223, 122 S. E.
586 (1924); Fields v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249
S. W. 798 (1923); Allen v. Diamond, 13 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
In Virginia it is provided by statute that: "In any action .... on a policy
of insurance hereafter issued to any person, .... to recover for the death of
such person, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide or *as
put to death by execution under the law; provided however, that if there shall
be an express provision in the body of such policy limiting the liability of
the insurer in the event that the insured shall, within two years from the
date thereof, die by his own act, such provision shall be valid ....
CODE ANa. (Michie, 1930) 1932 Supp., § 4228.

"

VA.

4 See the principal case, at 178 S. E. 526.
5 Ibid., 527.
0 Ibid., 528.
7 W. VA. CONST., art. 3,

8 VANCE

ON INSURANCE

§

18.

(2d ed. 1930) 201.

9Ibid.
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operation of law. Such a person either cannot take the legal title
at all,10 or else is declared constructive trustee of the property.11
Judicially articulated public policy there prevents hte wrongdoer
from taking, squarely in the face of statutes of descent which vest
property in the killer immediately upon the death of the decedent."
Public policy may go far to controvert statutory law, or to work,
an exception to an insurance contract, 3 where the beneficiary is a
wrongdoer; but in the instant set-up, where the beneficiary is entirely innocent, it is submitted that to override established law
public policy should be given legislative expression.
Certainly, unless there is evidence that deaths by execution
were not included in the computation of the mortality tables on
which the insurer bases his rates, denial of recovery here would be
giving the insurer a windfall, for if such deaths were so included,
the insurer was paid to take such risk.
In sum, the forthright disposition of the problem in the principle case should put the matter at rest.
-HERSCHEL H. RoSE, JR.

NAvIGABLE WA mS -

NAviGABILITY -

RIPARAN

OwVNER'S

RIGHT OF AccEss. - The United States government authorized the
straightening of the James River to improve navigation between
Hopewell and Richmond, Va., a distance of twenty-five miles. It
was for the benefit of the city of Richmond, and the city brought
condemnation proceedings. Defendants, riparian owners, claimed
damages to their rights of access through prospective diversion of
the river from their lands. The city claimed that riparian owners
have no private property rights in the flowing of streams inconsistent with the public right of navigation, and that no damages
should be awarded such owners by reason of diversion or diminu10 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N . Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
11 Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927).
i2 W. VA. RBv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 1, § 1.
13 The courts make an exception to life insurance contracts by holding that

the beneficiary in a policy of insurance who murders the insured will be denied
the right to recover thereon upon grounds of public policy. Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919) ; Wickline, Adm'r
v. Life Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S. E. 743 (1928). The legislature has
constituted conviction of felonious killing a bar to the claim of the convicted
party to the insurance or property of the decedent. W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931)
c. 42, art. 4, § 2. See Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 188; (1935) 41 W. VA. L.

Q. 287.
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